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A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGE OF LAWYERS
Lawyers have recently become a favorite target for
criticism from both within and without their profession; nowhere are they more vulnerable than in their use of the English language.
their

Whether they imitate cuttlefish by obscuring

paths with

ink or

simply reflect the complexity of

twentieth century civilization with their language presents
a question not soon to be resolved.

Yet since law must serve

society and since language must serve law, the questions concerning lawyers' uses and abuses of language will continue to
press.
Though common in casual debate, most generalizations
about the language of lawyers are difficult--if not impossible--to support.

Hence,

it is necessary to confront the

problem in terms of particulars.

Since the language of the

law is neither homogenous nor distinctly separate from other
varieties of English,
analysis.

it does not yield easily to generic

Yet analyzed it must be.

I would like to suggest

that analysis should be confined to the specific document,
the specific sentence and the specific word that appear within that vast array of discourse which has been dubbed "the
language of the law."
The purpose of this article is to present one such
specific inquiry as an avenue_for_ su_9gesting,

primari~y

by

example, an analytical model that might be useful for similar
1

2

inquiries, both to lawyers and to others who share an interest in the language of lawyers.

I would like to design a

model whose elements would accommodate any sample of legal
language, one that would serve the draftsmen, editors, and
critics

of

statutes,

judicial

opinions,

pleadings,

con-

tracts, warranties, briefs and--in short--the whole panoply of
legal documents.

Yet the very diversity of those documents

will compel this article-length presentation to fall short of
that aspiration.

Thus, the discussion that follows must be

read as one of a potentially infinite number of such discussions, with all of the deficiencies attendant upon any single
one.
The

careful

choice

of

a

therefore, of utmost importance.
chosen

for

analysis

is Section
(Second) of the Law of A9ency. 1

sample

for

The sample
220 (2)

of

analysis
that

I

is,
have

the Restatement

This choice was not arbitrary, but was predicated upon a variety of factors, 2 some of

1 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of the
Law of Agency (St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers,
1958), Sec. 220(2), pp. 485-486.
(Hereafter "Section 220.")
2our ing the past three academic years, I have led
seminars at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of
Law entitled Effective Expression in the Practice of Law. As
one of their initial assignments, advanced law students were
required to submit a sample of what they considered to represent the best from the language of the law, along with an
analysis, in order that the seminar could focus upon the linguistic peculiarities of those samples. out of approximately
150 samples received, Section 220(2) was the best and most
representative of the peculiarities observed, both by the
seminars and in the existing literatur_e _(see note 3 below).
I should like to express my thanks here to all of the contributing members of those seminars, since without them this
article would never have been written.
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which were,

in turn,

dictated by certain presuppositions:

tentative generalizations

about

the

language

that

lawyers

commonly use.
While many of the most striking peculiarities of the
language of lawyers are lexical, others extend to the levels
of the phrase, the sentence, the paragraph, and the document.
Phrasal placement

is sometimes odd and repetition of key

phrases is more common than in standard usage.

Sentences grow

to extreme length and often contain many levels of subordination, as well as multiple coordination.
even clauses

Words, phrases, and

in series--sometimes quite

long--are common.

Sentences are frequently couched in the passive voice for no
apparent reason.

These seem to be those features that are

most commonly pointed to as peculiar, either in kind or in
degree, to the language of the law. 3

Section 220 includes

3niscussions and critical analyses of the language of
the law are neither rare nor unduly obscure. For a thorough
bibliography of such works published prior to 1963, see David
Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Boston:
Little, Brown
and Company, 1963), pp. 455-478.
See also James B. White,
The Legal Imagination (Boston:
Little ;--B'rown and Company,
1973), pp. 968-969, and William P. Statsky and R. John
Wernet, Jr., Case Analysis and Fundamentals of Legal Writi~
(St. Paul: West, 1977), pp. 563-568.
For surveys and discussions of the peculiarities of
the language of the law, see especially:
Mellinkoff, QE.·
cit., pp. 11-29 ("characteristics" and "mannerisms of the
language of the law"); Frank E. Cooper, writing in Law Practice (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 6-36 ( 11 uses of
11
words," words and phrases to avoid, 11 "style in legal writing11); Morton s. Freeman, The Grammatical Lawyer (Philadelphia:
American Law Institute, 1979) (a collection of
short articles, primarily on legal word usage); and Robert P.
Charrow and Veda R. Charrow, 11 Making Legal Language Understandable:
A Psycholinguistic study of Jury Instructions, 11
Columbia Law Review, 79 (1979), pp. 1321-1328 (an empirical
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manifestations of all of them; hence, its choice.

Finally, I

choose a restatement section 4 ~-as opposed to some other variety of legal language--because of the well-known care that
goes into the drafting and editing of the restatements.

This

reputation for an extra measure of care allows the critic a
presumption that every detail of the passage, down to the
seemingly most unimportant punctuation, manifests the intentions of the authors.
My critical scheme will be an attempt at synthesis of
three, fairly diverse schools of thought about language.

I

shall use modern grammar to break the sentence down into its
constituent parts.

I shall look to traditional rhetorical

theory to provide categories for analysis of the balance and

study of how certain linguistic constructions, e.g., "prepositional phrases," "misplaced phrases," "lexical items,"
"negatives," "passives," and "embeddings," affect comprehension).
4
.
"The Restatements of the Law are the most widely accepted secondary authority on United States law written in
this century.
The state and federal courts have cited the
Restatement more than 45,000 times, usually following the Restatement position.
The authority of the Restatements comes from the
courts' recognition of the caliber of the people who were responsible for the Restatements and the soundness of the positions stated by them.
The Restatements are the product of
the American Law Institute, which is composed of 1500 scholars of the law--judges, practitioners, and teachers.
As originally conceived, their purpose was stated by
the American Law Institute as follows:
'To present an orderly restatement of the general
common law of the United States, including in that
term not only the law developed solely by judicial
decision, but also law that has grown from the application by the courts of statutes that were generally
enacted and were in force for many years.'"
Maurice L. Cohen, How to Find the Law, (St. Paul:
West,
1976), p. 290.

5

symmetry 5 of

the Section.

Throughout,

I

shall

rely upon

structural linguistics to provide a model of the "speech
event." 6 This model will allow integration of grammatical
and rhetorical analyses, as well as its own unique analytical
concerns, into a composite whole; thus, the elements of that
model will provide

the

basic structure of my discussion.

(All of these approaches, by the way, have proven useful in
the analysis of all kinds of language.) Finally, I shall attempt to broaden some of my observations into generalizations
about some distinct critical postures that are useful in the
analysis of the language of the law.
Let us look at the language of Section 220 itself.
In determining whether one acting for another is a
servant or ~n independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement,
the master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision:
5Rhetorical theory has the special advantage of providing categories for analysis that extend to many levels and
aspects of the document. In terms of developmental analysis,
it gives us the "common topics" of discovery:
definition,
comparison, relationship, and so on.
In terms of stylistic
analysis, it gives us the "schemes of construction." Of most
use to us here will be parallelism and antithesis, two primary "schemes of balance," and ellipsis, a "scheme of omission."
(Other topics, schemes and tropes would prove useful
in the analysis of such argumentative legal writing as the
memorandum of law and the appellate brief.) Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 110-145, 463-465, 468-469.
6 "speech event" is a phrase used by the structural
linguists to include all instances of communication through

6

(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for
the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the per son is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular
business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
7
This passage is undeniably difficult.
Most readers
of

the

English language would say that it

is unnecessar-

ily so; yet any astute reader would concede that evaluating a passage

in isolation--apart from its linguistic en-

vironment by a reader not a member of its intended audience-would produce an unfair evaluation of its quality, if not a
mistaken interpretation of its meaning.
In what has come

to be

the standard

text

in the

field of legal drafting, 8 Professor Dickerson stresses the
communicative aspects of drafting by dwelling upon the importance of

11

relevant context or environment" 9 as one of the

"four main elements" 10 in written communication.

language, both oral and written, according to the theory that
writing is essentially written speech.
7 American Law Institute. loc. cit ..

8 Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965). See pp. 4-7 for
a definition of 11 legal drafting. 11
-9

rbid., p. 19.
10 rbid.
The other three elements are:
"(1)
author, (2)the audience, (3) the written utterance."

the

7

The fourth element in any written communication, including a legal instrument, is the part of the surrounding environment or external context that the written instrument takes into account. External context refers to
the social, economic, and cultural setting in which the
instrument is to operate.
The context in which an instrument operates is significant because it is highly improbable that any document, taken entirely apart from the
relevant environment that it presupposes, can convey
meaning, except in another environment that shares some
of the same elements. It is the essence of a language to
reflect and express, and even to affect, the patterns of
established ideas and values that help to shape the culture to which it belongs.
External environment consists of two elements:
(1) the established patterns of ideas and values immediately underlying the language; and ( 2) the relevant
collateral and usually tacit assumptions that are
shared and taken account of by the great bulk of the
speech community to which both the draftsman and his audience belong.
The first of these two elements gives
language its primary meanings. The second conditions or
colors the primary meanings and provides the basis for
the meanings known as implications.
Implication, constituting, as it does, what Hall has called the "silent
language," thus furnishes a necessary part of the total
message.
A telephone call at 3 A.M., for example, carries emergency implications missing from a similar telephone call at 3 P.M.
So speaks the silent language of
time. 11
So context is obviously a delicate concern for
draftsmen as well as for writers.

The notion has received a

great deal of attention by the relatively new discipline of
informational theory.

According to Roman Jakobson, it be-

hooves the critic to analyze spoken and writ ten communications as speech events.

To that end, he has developed the
following analytical scheme. 12

11 Ibid., pp. 20-21, footnotes deleted.
12 Roman Jakob son.
"Concluding Statement:
Lingui sties. and Poetics," in Style. in Language, ed., Thomas A.Sebeok (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p. 353.
It is
interesting to note that the above model has the potential to

8

The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To
be operative the message requires a CONTEXT referred to
("referent"
in another, somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature), seizable by the addressee, and either verbal or
capable of being verbalized; a CODE fully, or at least
partially, common to the addresser and addressee (or in
other words, to the encoder and decoder of the message);
and, finally a CONTACT, a physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee, enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication. All these factors inalienably involved in verbal
communication may be schematized as follows:
CONTEXT
MESSAGE
ADDRESSER--------------------------------------ADDRESSEE
CODE
CONTACT
We should probably note here that while all of these
factors are identifiable in our everyday experience with language, CONTEXT is the most complex and the most troublesome.
Keys to its interpretation are that it represents that which
is "referred to" by the ADDRESSER, that it is "seizable" by
the ADDRESSEE, and that it is roughly analogous to the notion
of referent.
While

the

notion of

referent

functions

adequately

when the message is sufficiently concrete--as in "This is a
typed page"--that notion loses its critical precision as the
message becomes increasingly complex and abstract.

For ex-

analyze such various communications as the simple, binary
message-transmission that is effected by turning on a light
switch and the ultra-sophisticated biological transmissions
that are effected by cerebral, electrochemical neurotr ansmitters.
See generally, Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics
(Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1976).
This combination of versatility and precision is what makes the
Jakobson model so attractive as an analytical tool.

9

ample, in the message, "Brut us is an honour able man," 13 we
would be hard pressed to point to an accessible referent for
"honourable" in the same, simple manner that we could point
to the referent for "page."
evidence in the CONTACT:
Caesar; in the CODE:

We would have to look to other
the text of Shakespeare's Julius

Elizabethan English; and as elsewhere

manifested by the ADDRESSER:

William Shakespeare

which may give us a key to the irony involved).

(all of

By the time

that we have considered all of these pertinent variables, the
notion of "referent," in relation to the word "honourable,"
has lost its precision and therefore its validity as a critical term.
Hence,

we

refer

to

CONTEXT

instead,

under

whose

auspices we can accumulate most of the data necessary to
analyze properly that aspect of message-transmission.

Be-

cause of its broad use of "context," one that encompasses
both the primary and secondary senses addressed by Dickerson,
and because of its integration of context with other closely
related factors in the speech event (e.g., the relationship
between ADDRESSER and ADDRESSEE) Jakobsen's paradigm fits our
purposes well.

It allows us a precise analytical tool with

which to consider the peculiarities of the language of lawyers.

13 corbett uses this line, which is repeated several
times
in Mark
Anthony's
well-known
funereal
oration
("Friends, Romans, Countrymen . . . , ") Shakespeare, Julius
Ceasar, III, ii, 11. 78 ff.), to illustrate irony (Corbett,
~· cit., pp. 489-490).

10
Now

the

task

of

differentiating

legal

language

from American English of general usage, for the purpose of
examining the distinctive features of the former, would be a
simple one if we could identify these as two separate and
distinct CODES.

Though this may have been possible with ref-

erence to early English law when the courts used their own
peculiar language, 14 it is not such a simple matter with respect to contemporary American legal language.

The CODES

used by the legal profession and by others are so similar
that such a differentiation would seem forced.

Upon the com-

mon basis of general and legal usage, Dickerson comments:
The principles of communication are not a matter of
legal fiat, to be changed at the will of the draftsman.
Common to all human effort, they exist independently of
the law.
Communication is based on the language habits
of particular speech communities. Language is founded on
usage and, although in particular cases usage can be violated or changed, to dispense with it altogether would
make communication impossible.
The core of sound communication, therefore, is general adherence to the existing conventions of language.
This neither freezes nor
sanctifies particular conventions. 15
Yet that peculiar conventions are observed in the
language of the law deserves further inquiry.

Some of these

conventions are functions of CODE.
The two primary elements of any verbal CODE are (1) a
vocabulary or lexicon, and (2) a set of rules and conventions

14 For a brief but well documented history of the language of the law, see D. Mellinkoff, £2· cit., pp. 33-284,
and particularly at pp. 95-135 for a discussion of the rise
and fall of law French. See also, John H. Fisher, "Chancery
and the Emergence of Standard Written English in the Fifte~nth Century," Speculum, 52, No. 2 (1971), pp. 870-899.
15 Dickerson, 2E· cit., pp. 18-19, footnotes deleted.
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for combining the individual words into sentences:

the rules

constitute a grammar and the less formal conventions may be
said to constitute a

(sometimes tacit) directory for usage

and style.
First, let us momentarily set aside lexical matters
(to be discussed below as a function of CONTEXT).

Next, in

keeping with Dickerson's perspective, let us agree that lawyers are compelled to observe the same grammar observed by
other speakers of the language.
ters

that

I

This brings us to those mat-

classified above as

less

formal conventions:

usage (beyond mere lexis) and style.
Analysing

the

syntax

of

our

sample,

Section 220,

while bearing the elements of Jakobsen's paradigm in mind,
will reveal some substantial departures from the conventions
of common usage.
To an ADDRESSEE unfamiliar with legal language, the
most striking (and most distressing) quality of this sentence
will probably be its sheer length--one hundred and seventythree words.

This sentence would demand an exceedingly for-

midable memory to retain its entire MESSAGE while reading it
once through. 16 Since it is grammatically flawless, let us

16 The role and functions of memory in the process of
reading have been studied at length, especially by the psycholinguists in their quest for an accurate readability formula. They have known for some time that we possess memory
of (at least) two kinds:
short-term and long-term.
Since
the clause is the "minimal unit that has semantic determin~ncyr" readers must retain strings of_words in short-term
memory until reaching (at least) the end of a clause, i.e.,
until discovering "closure," and thereby ascertaining meaning (Hirsch, The Philosophy of Composition (Chicago:
Uni-

12

begin an analysis by breaking it into its primary phrasal and
clausal elements.
dependent

"In determining" begins a fourteen word

prepositional phrase,

which

is

followed

rather brief, nine word independent main clause:

by the

"the fol-

lowing matters of fact, among others, are considered."

The

versity of Chicago Press, 1977) p. 108). Once closure is
reached and meaning established, the message is (at least in
theory) recoded from its grammatical structure into a more
abstract form.
This recoding allows transfer of the informational content into intermediate or long-term memory and
thereby relieves short-term memory of its load in order that
it may be called upon to process the next clausal unit. This
serial process of occupation and evacuation of short-term
memory is absolutely essential to ultimate comprehension in
that short-term memory admits of a strict limit upon the
amount (or number of bits) of information that it can hold.
Upon this much, experts in the field generally agree.
(See
Hirsch,~· cit., p. 86.)
--Studies contributing to the search for a universal
readability formula, one that would predict the relative difficulty of any given prose passage, have demonstrated the
complexity of evaluating a number of sets of variables that
contribute to readability. Certain formulas, while valuable
for rating primary school texts, seem to lack the sophistication necessary for evaluating more complex materials. In
these, the variables that appear most frequently are wordlength and sentence-length, which undoubtedly contribute to
reading difficulty.
(See generally Flesch, The Art of Readable Writing (New York:
Harper and Row, 1949), Fry, "A
Readability Formula that Saves Time," Journal of Reading, 11
(1968) p. 513, and Flesch, The Art of Plain Talk (New York:
Collier, 1951). To be precise though, a readability formula
would presumably measure MESSAGE magnitude through the complexities of CONTEXT and CODE that are implemented in the
transmission of the MESSAGE.
John R. Bormuth, in "Readability: A new approach," Reading Research Quarterly 1, no. 3
( 1966) pp. 79-13 2, demonstrated through in tr ica te research
techniques that: "[o]ver 150 linguistic variables have been
shown to correlate with difficulty" ibid., p. 130).
What remains to be establish~then, is the precise
capacity and character of our language processing mechanisms.
We know that certain kinds of training maximize our capacity
for related kinds of recoding, just the way that an individual learning radio-telegraphic code builds his capacity
for mentally organizing larger and larger chunks of dits and
dahs (George A. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or

13
colon, in combination with the cataphoric 17 "following," anticipates the series of ten appositive clauses.

The hundred

and fifty words that make up these clauses constitute the
great bulk of the sentence, in terms of both length and informational content.

Since this is a sentence of comparative
definition by division, 18 it is quite appropriate that the
criteria that it offers, in phrases
prominent.

~

through

i'

should be so

Further, its definitional character justifies its

extreme length insofar as the unity of definition is best
manifested by a single, well-integrated sentence. 19 Given
the complexity of the problem to which this sentence responds
(of differentiating a "servant"

from an "independent con-

tractor" for the purpose of assigning liability) we see that
great length may be a necessary by-product of and a major
contributer to the linguistic integrity (i.e., the value as a
MESSAGE transmission) of this sentence.

Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," The Psychological Review, 63, No. 2 (1956), pp. 9296).
I am content that habitual readers of the language of
the law similarly build their capacity for processing sentences of extreme length. The organizing mechanisms remain
obscure, but they probably involve maximizing the capacity of
short-term memory, streamlining transfer to long-term memory
(probably through the use of thematic tags) and increasing
tolerance to the necessity for multiple reprocessing.
17 I.e., a "discourse reference" that points forward.
Randolph Quirk and Sidney Greenbaum, A Concise Grammar of
Contemporary English (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1973)' p. 302.
18 This is a rhetorical, as opposed to a grammatical,
characterization of the sentence. See Corbett, 2£· cit., pp.
110-123.
19 The question of whether or not the unity of defini-
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"[A]mong others," the prepositional phrase that interrupts the main clause, seems to weaken the declarative
value of

the

rest

of

the

clause,

"the following matters

of fact . . . are considered." That is, since neither the main
verb, consider, nor the passive voice convey exclusivity, the
prepositional phrase may appear to be, at best, redundant,
and, at worst, intentionally obfuscating.
But let us look to the peculiarities of law itself
for another explanation for this peculiarity of its language.
In that light, we could build an argument that the inclusion
of "among others" manifests foresight and great caution on
the part of the ADDRESSERS.

It functions as a recognition of

the open texture of the legal language and as a prohibition
against interpreting the criteria that follow as exclusive-one

that the ADDRESSERS apparently perceived as

not only

tion is best so manifested remains unsettled. In fact, little has been written lately upon the essential character or
the content-limitations of the sentence (except in relation
to readability theories. See note 15 above). But the somewhat outdated notion of the sentence as "forming the grammatically complete expression of a single thought" (Oxford
English Dictionary, under sentence) may retain special relevance for the language of the law.
The clause "is the minimal unit that has semantic determinancy" (Hirsch, 2.12. cit. , p. 10 9) , and the sentence is defined as "a grammatically self-contained unit consisting of a
word or a syntactically related group of words that express
an assertion, a question, a command, a wish or an explanation . . . " (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged, def. 3 under sentence) .
Since Section 220 manifests a single assertion (and since it,
like all assertions of the law--primary or secondary--implies
a single command), it seems beneficial to phrase it in one
"grammatically self-contained unit." From a very pragmatic
perspective, phrasing such an assertion in a single sentence
denies the possibility of incompletely quoting the law (without the inclusion of telling ellipses.).

15
necessary, but as imperative. 20
The interrupting phrase operates here as a qualifier.
While that role is a primary one fulfilled by the interrupting phrase in all types of language, the need for such qualification is nowhere greater than in the language of the law,
given

its potential,

seeable ADDRESSEES
and the

eventual impact upon future,

(e.g.,

attorneys,

litigants,

unfore-

jurists),

tendency of all legally trained ADDRESSEES toward

careful reading and literal interpretation.
This justification of the inclusion of "among others"
contributes to the initial premise that great length is a
necessary by-product of the MESSAGE of Section 220 insofar as
that interrupting phrase is neither superfluous nor unnecessarily cumbersome.

But that phrase accounts for only two of

the sentence's one hundred and seventy-three words, while the
items in series account for one hundred and fifty; hence, a
careful look at the form and sense of these items seems nee-

20 "Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is
chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour,
these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is
in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has
been termed an open texture. So far we have presented this,
in the case of legislation, as a general feature of human
language; uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be
paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of
communication concerning matters of fact. Natural languages
like English are when so used irreducibly open textured • . • •
The open texture of law means that there are, indeed,
areas of conduct where much must be left to be developed by
courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight
from case to case," Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 124-125, 132.

16

essary in order to satisfy ourselves that they, like the interrupting phrase, are warranted.
The volume and content of the case-law which these
appositive clauses summarize reveals that the sense which
they convey would be ample for

the composition of a short

treatise on the problem of differentiating servants from independent contractors.

So it would seem that this hundred

and seventy-three word sentence is, ironically enough, an attempt at condensation, aspiring to optimum conciseness.

To

determine how successful that attempt is, we must look to the
effectiveness of these appositive clauses in transmitting the
intended MESSAGE.
The

introductory phrase

and main clause

are dis-

tributed21 to govern the ten appositive clauses that follow
the colon; all ten fall within the scope of the introductory
phrase and main clause.

This sentence, then, could be para-

phrased into ten sentences, all of which would begin with the
same twenty-three words.

But despite the fact that those ten

sentences would be shorter individually, the task of processing the combined MESSAGE would be more demanding--if only
because the total number of words would be increased by nine
times twenty-three (or two hundred and seven).

The ADDRESS-

EES have taken advantage, then, of grammatical principles,
(i.e. , cataphoric reference, apposition and maximum ell ipsis) in order to achieve the enhanced rhetorical effects of

21 The term, "distributed," is borrowed from mathematics where, for example, x (a+b+c . • . +j) = xa+xb+xc . . . +xj.

17
structural integrity, balance and economy.

These combine to

approach ideals refined in well-stated mathematical formulae.
But what of those ten appositive clauses themselves?
If the mathematical analogy is to be extended, they should
also adhere to principles of symmetry.
Each

clause

names

a

specific

criterion

which

is

partly determinative of an individual's status as either servant or independent contractor.

Since the phrase to which

they are all set in apposition, matters of fact,

is quite

general in meaning, their informational diversity is neither
surprising nor a serious impediment to comprehension.

The

form that these clauses take, however, varies substantially
from one to the next.

One must ask why.

Five begin with whether, three of those with whether
or not, and an additional one includes whether in medial position.

The remaining four seem formally diverse--both from

the whether clauses and from each other.

In fact,

though,

the principle of symmetry has been grammatically extended to
reach all ten.

By virtue of their character as appositives,

they are all noun phrases and clauses.

Another, more dis-

tinguishing similarity resides slightly beneath the surface:
they

all
clauses. 22

are

(or,

at

least,

suggest)

interrogative

The three whether or not clauses (£, h &

i)

pose

22 The whether or not and whether clauses all strictly
conform to Quirk and Greenbaum's (£12.. cit.) description of
interrrogative clauses at section 11.14-11.15. The remaining
four (~, £, d & f) do not. Because of their lack of predica-
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simple "yes-no" questions. 23

The other three clauses that

contain whether
(~,
~
& i)
tions. 24 The four clauses (~,

pose
_£,

d

"alternative"

ques-

f), those remaining

&

quesare most formally diverse, all imply "wh-"
tions. 25 Their diversity is compelled by the diverse char-

which

acter of the criteria to which they point (e.g., extent of
control, skill required, length of time).

No matter what the

character of the CODE, the potential for symmetry is limited
by the informational diversity of the MESSAGE.
It would appear that the drafters of the Section 220
have taken optimum advantage of the potential of grammar for
producing a symmetrical sentence through parallel clauses and
phrases, since every evidence of asymmetry points not to a
feature of CODE,

but to a. feature of the diversity, com-

plexity and magnitude of the MESSAGE.

Maximum ellipsis has

been achieved by maximizing the scope of the cataphoric reference, which, in turn, produces economy.

The compound, one-

to-ten apposition clearly establishes the intended relation-

t ion, they should technically be characterized as phrases
rather than as clauses. However, these plainly imply "wh-"
questions with the "wh-element" (see note 24 below) and an
intensive verb ell ipted.
With the ellipted elements supplied, they read:
[what] the extent of control [is] • . . ,
[what] the kind of occupation [is] . . . , [what] the skill
required
[is] . . . ,
and
[what]
the length of time
[is] . . . . With these insertions, these appositive phrases
become interrogative clauses; hence, I refer to them as such
during the rest of this discussion.
23 Quirk and Greenbaum, sec. 7.51.
24 Ibid., sec. 7.54.
25 Ibid. sec. 7.52.
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ship of identity.

The parallel structural character of the

ten matters of fact aids the ADDRESSEE in comprehension (so
far as is possible given the blend of alternative, yes-no,
and wh- questions involved) .

Further economy of diction may

be tested by scanning this sentence for redundant elements or
unnecessary repetitions. I discover none. 26
Punctuation is a further element of CODE that remains
unconsidered, and, while its significance is relatively minor
when compared to that of grammatical and structural balance,
it bears at least passing consideration.

The punctuation in
this sentence may be safely characterized as close: 27 that
is, where punctuation is optional, it has been included.

Ex-

amples of such optional punctuation are the paired commas
that surround

~the

agreement

in~

and in the locality in £ 1

and the comma that precedes the conjunctive and in the series
of

three

nominal

elements--instrumentalities,

tools,

and

place of work--in e.
While modern trends in usage tend toward open--as opposed to close--punctuation, the latter is desirable when it
serves as an aid to comprehension.

Since the optional commas

which are included in our example assist the ADDRESSEE in
identifying syntactical units and in clarifying grammatical
26 The single possible exception is the phrasing of
criterion i: while it appears to be a "yes-no" question, it
is couched in an "alternative" construction.
27 For a discussion of open versus close punctuation,
see Ebbitt and Ebbitt, Writer's Guide and Index to English
-(6th ed.)
(Glenville, Illinois:
Scott Foresman and Co.,
1978) 1 P• 267
o
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relationships, close punctuation must be considered an asset
here. 28
This general

rule of

thumb concerning punctuation

governs the inclusion of the nine semicolons.
mary

function of

While the pri-

the semicolon is to link two coordinate

clauses whose relatedness is too great to phrase in two separate sentences, an approved secondary function is to separate units with internal commas. 29 When used according to
this secondary function, the semicolon's role in the CODE is
virtually identical to that of the comma.

Viewed in terms of

the mathematical analogy, the comma and the semicolon serve
purposes in syntax similar to those served by parentheses and
brackets in the complex mathematical equation.

Because of

the frequency of occurence in legal language of complex syntax loaded with interrupting elements, this secondary use of
the semicolon--as a kind of "superordinate comma"--is much
more common than use according to its primary function.
As a further aid to comprehension, the ADDRESSER has
tabulated
through

i)

the

ten appositive clauses

(with the letters a

and has set them off with the sort of indentation

and lineation that readers are accustomed to seeing in outline format.

While the combination of these devices, some-

28 The grouping of bits, or single pieces, of information into chunks, or interrelated configurations, decreases
the effort which must be expended to process that information. See, Miller, 2£· cit., pp. 92-96.
29 Ebbitt and Ebbitt, 2£· cit., pp. 629-630.
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times

referred

to

as

tabulation," 30 is

"enumerated

not

strictly an aspect of grammar or usage, it contributes significantly to the ease with which this massive coordination
may be

processed;

hence,

enumerated

tabulation

should be

thought of as a feature of CODE which gains its importance
through expediting MESSAGE transmission.
Though, as indicated above, another primary feature
of CODE is the vocabulary of a language, lexical matters must
be discussed in terms of the dynamic relationship between
CODE and CONTEXT.

And while the specialized vocabulary of

the law is most certainly a feature of usage with rhetorical
implications, the Jakobsen paradigm has the virtue of allowing the critic to segregate a discussion of meaning (CONTEXT)
from a discussion of form (CODE)--so far as that is possible.
Here, we are concerned with the sense of the words in our example, and the ways in which that sense differs from the corresponding sense of those words when they appear outside of a
legal CONTEXT.
Once more, we shall need to establish some categories
for analysis.
adjective,

Let us begin with the parts of speech:

verb,

adverb,

article,

demonstrative,

preposition, conjunction and interjection.

noun,

pronoun,

(Because of the

oral and almost exclusively attitudinal character of the interjection,

it does not occur in formal legal usage, and,

30 Dickerson, ~· cit., pp. 85-92 and Richard C.
Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers (Durham: Carolina Academic
Press, 1979), pp. 39-40.
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therefore, may be disregarded here.)

The remaining parts of

speech fall into two classifications:
closed-system i terns
and open-class items. 31 The number of closed-system items in
a language--articles, demonstratives, pronouns, prepositions
and conjunctions--is static;

that is,

these sets of words

cannot normally be extended by addition of new members.
The items are said to constitute a system in being
(i) reciprocally exclusive: the decision to use one of
them in a structure excludes the possibility of using any
other • . . ; and (ii) reciprocally defining: it is less
easy to state the meaning of any individual item than to
define it in relation to the rest of the system. 32
So the use of the pronoun he in a sentence, for example, preeludes the use of any other pronoun in its place (e.g., she,
they or him), and it would be difficult to define words such
as and, of or the without referring to them as a conjunction,
a preposition or an article, respectively.
On the other hand, open-class i terns--nouns, adj ectives, verbs and adverbs--may be extended indefinitely by the
addition of new members to the classes (e.g., with words like
aviatrix, television, neutrino and antiquark).

Scientific

and technological advances during this century alone have introduced a great

flock

of

new open-class

i terns

into

the

language.
31 Quirk and Greenbaum, sees. 2.14-2.15. Wydick (£2.
cit., pp. 7-10) refers to most closed-system items as "working words" and most open-class items as "glue words." These
categories, while slightly less precise, may be easier t.o
work with.
32 Quirk and Greenbaum, loc. cit.
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This

distinction

between

open-class

and

closed-

system items would lead us to anticipate that the variation
in diction between legal and general usage is confined to the
open-class i terns, and this is largely true. 33 In our example,
another,

the CONTEXTS
the,

for

such words

among and over

as

in,

are absolutely

whether,

one,

identical to

their CONTEXTS in non-legal usage, where they fulfill identical syntactical functions.
While

disposing

of

the

whole

category of closed-

system items narrows the necessary scope of our inquiry into
CONTEXT, focus upon the remaining (open-class) items begins
to lay bare what is probably the single most formidable barrier to a clear understanding of the language of the law-both particularly, as with our example, and generically, as a
peculiar linguistic phenomenon.
Let us begin by simply listing the root forms of the
open-class items from the first, twenty-three word segment of
our example and labeling them according to their parts of
speech.
determine
act
be
servant
independent
contractor

verb
verb
verb
noun
adjective
noun

33 occasionally, though, a legal document will stipulate altered definitions for closed-system i terns.
For example, "words importing the masculine gender may be applied
to females" (1 u.s.c. 1) changes the meaning of the pronoun
"he," substantially.
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following
matter
fact
be
consider

adjective
noun
noun
verb
verb

All of these words are relatively current in common
usage.

None would give any competent reader of English the

least occasion to pause.

But the problem is this:

for some

of these words, the legal CONTEXT is significantly different
from the CONTEXT that they would carry in a non--legal environment, while for others, no such difference in CONTEXT
distinguishes their legal meanings from their common meanings.
Once these open-class items are isolated for examination,

three

observations

are

possible:

(a) that

the

degree of difference between their meanings in the legal CONTEXT and the CONTEXT of general usage 34 varies from no difference whatsoever to a difference that approaches the absolute; (b) that some gain specialized meaning simply by virtue of their appearance in CONTEXT 1 and by the even more particular CONTEXT that is peculiar to such documents as decisions and restatements; and (c) that some must be treated
in combination, as phrasal elements, to retain a proper sense
of their denotation in CONTEXT1 •
Bearing these general observations in mind, then, I
shall deal with the above open-class i terns

to attempt

to

34 For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to the CONTEXT of the language of the law as CONTEXT and to the CONTEXT of general usage as CONTEXT throughout the remainder of
this discussion.
g
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analyse them in CONTEXT , as they are used in the Sect ion
1
220.

The word, determine, conveys a sense quite similar to
one of its primary denotations

in general par lance.

The

single significant difference concerns the motive for--and
more

especially,

the

impact

volved.

The foundation for

CONTEXT

peculiar

to

of--the

determine-ation

in-

this distinction lies in that

decisions,

restatements,

scholarly

treatises, hornbooks and other statements of rationale, based
upon policy, behind the law.
mining?

Who or what is doing the deter-

Because of the passive voice in which the sentence

is cast, where the subject of the main verb

(consider)

is

truncated, the complement of the sentence does not offer an
explicit key to the who or what question.

The answer is, of

course, that the law and its official representatives are the
agents of the action.

As in any kind of discourse, the agent

of the action is inferred from the context.

In more partic-

ular terms, juries and judges bear responsibility for "determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor," with the guidance of binding authority
of previous decisions and such persuasive authority as the
Restatement. 35

In CONTEXT 1 , determine carries the substantial weight of the authority of the law and of its potential

alteration upon the destinies of litigants--foreseen and unforeseen.

In Dickerson's terms, this is the effect of "ex-

35 see note 4 above.
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ternal context."

When compared to its CONTEXTg' determine

simply differs in terms of that particular authority which is
associated with the institution of law.
As verbs, both determine and consider must be DECODED
with the authority of the (implied) agents of the action in
mind.

The verb, act, however, carries no such peculiar sense

in CONTEXTl.

In fact,

its sense is identical to the cor-

responding sense of act in CONTEXT g . This corresondence of
meaning extends, in large part, to the intensive verb, be, 36
in the clause, "whether one acting for another is a servant
or an independent contractor."
But here again the authority of the law adds weight
to the predication--here to the relationship of identity established between the pro_noun, one, and its complements, 37
servant and independent contractor.

The be in this clause

might be read in CONTEXT 1 to imply, "whether one acting for
another is [for the purpose of assigning liability, to be defined as] a servant or an independent contractor."
Servant is the first item of diction to be confronted
in our sample whose meaning is unique in CONTEXT 1 .
in the Restatement, 38 the term is defined:

Elsewhere

[a] servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the

36 Quirk and Greenbaum, sees. 12.8-12.10.
But note
that Wydick 12£. cit., p. 8) classifies forms of the verb, to
be, as "glue words:-"
37 Quirk and Greenbaum, loc. cit.
38 sec. 2 (2).
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performance of the service is controlled or is subject to
the right to control by the master.
This definition bears little resemblance to the cornrnon denotations of servant in sentences such as, "This is the
servant's day off.," or "The governor is a public servant."
Its CONTEXT 1 draws its precision, in part, from collateral
terms of law (i.e., agent and master) which are central to
its legal meaning.

Here is a linguistic situation which

threatens to confuse the ADDRESSEE, who is unschooled in CONTEXT , with a long chain of interdependent meanings.
1
In order to understand the semantic thrust of this
Restatement section, the ADDRESSEE must seek the meaning of
some of its terms from other sources. 39

Once the pertinent

definition is discovered, the reader finds that his ultimate
goal, comprehension, may be far from reached.

An understand-

ing of what constitutes a servant requires prior understanding, according to the above definition, of what constitutes
an

agen~

and a master.

Further search reveals that similar

problems will arise with the discovery of the Restatement
definitions

of rnaster 40 and

agent. 41

While

this complex

39 For example, a master's vicarious liability must be
predicated upon negligence, which is defined by the law of
torts.
40 "A master is a principal who employs an agent to
perform service in his affairs and who controls or has the
right to control the physical conduct of the other in the
performance of the service." Restatement (Second) of the Law
of Agency, ~- cit.
(hereafter "Restatement"), sec. 2(1).
41 "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
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problem of definition is not insoluable, it does make substantial demands upon any ADDRESSEE and especially one who is
not familiar with the subtleties of the common law, its fluid
character and its use of language.
problems,

Two intimately related

quite apart from long chains of related de£ ini-

tions, seem almost bound to put the ultimate goal of thorough
comprehension out of reach.

First, the fact that words with

a specialized sense in CONTEXT 1 also appear in general usage
tempts the ADDRESSEE to DECODE them according to his common
lexicon.

Second, d i scr imina t ion between those words

(1 ike

servant) that have a highly specialized sense in CONTEXT
those others

and
1
(like act) with no specialized sense requires

prior understanding, prior recognition.

These two problems

of construing the proper CONTEXT function as barriers to comprehension.

Their

net effect

is to force

the

reader

to

select a CONTEXT, either general or legal, for every openclass item he confronts in reading a legal document, where
the criteria for selection are unknown.

While not impos-

sible, this process is a bit like driving a complex route in
a foreign country, where the road forks frequently and where
the language of the road signs is unknown to the driver.
Like that driver, the reader's route is likely to be circuitous and full of frustration.

control, and consent by the other so to act.
The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
The one who is to act as the agent."
Restatement,
sec. 1 (1-3).
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That frustration is largely diminished with the appearance of words that are either peculiar to the CODE of
legal language or have fallen out of common use or both.
While servant continues to be recognized as current by lexical authorities, 42 it seems to have fallen into relative disuse.

I would guess that only rarely today do we speak or

write of a servant in the CONTEXT:

"someone privately employed to perform domestic services." 43

Chronologically considered, the CONTEXT 1 of servant
was undoubtedly drawn from CONTEXTg; in fact, at its point of
introduction into legal language, its CONTEXT 1 was probably
identical to its CONTEXTg. 44 Then the CONTEXTS began to diverge.

In common parlance, change in the meaning of servant

was compelled by changing social attitudes, in England and
America, about such things as domestic help and rising wage
levels for that help (which left servants in only the most
wealthy households), employer-employee relationships

(which

moved away from the total subjugation that servant, as compared with employee, tends to connote), and class and race
distinctions (which, particularly in the post-bellum American south,

had great effects upon the notion of domestic

service) .

42 see Webster's New International Dictionary (3rd
ed., 1971);-5ee also The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language~69).
43 The American Heritage Dictionary.
44 oxford English Dictionary, definitions under "servant."
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slave

Further, servant was often used as a euphemism for
during the 17th and 18th centuries in Arnerica. 45

Therefore, servant, in CONTEXTg, has since accumulated many
of those negative social connotations associated with the
relationship of master and servant: the corresponding CONTEXT 1 in which servant appears exclusively.

This, combined

with the increasing prosperity of the servant-less classes,
heralded the virtual demise of servant
CONTEXT it carries
Arner ica.
but are

(especially in the

in the phrase, master and servant)

in

Of course, these semantic shifts are not unique,
typical of

the

shifting meaning of words

in all

languages.
Now, despite the relative disappearance of servant in
Arner ican usage; it remained current in legal usage and its
meaning there continued to develop.

It retained the CONTEXT

of "one employed," but it became narrower, nearly neutral (in
terms of connotations), and much more precise.

The Restate-

ment definition summarizes the result (to its date of publication) of that evolution:

one that chronicles ordinary pro-

cesses of semantic change where those processes are affected
by litigation.
A primary effect of the divergence of servant between
two CONTEXTS and its decline in CONTEXTg is that servant now
stands out as an easily recognizable element of the language
of the law, which bears little resemblance to (and therefore

45 oxford
"servant."

English Dictionary,

definition

3b.

under
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causes little confusion with)
common usage.

its cor responding element in

Prior recognition, then, is probably not cru-

cial when a non-lawyer confronts servant in a legal document.
But prior recognition would be a necessary prerequisite for that reader to know that both independent contractor
and matters of fact must be treated--i.e., DECODED--as phrasal units in CONTEXT 1 .
Neither independent nor contractor is the least bit
unusual in everyday speech or writing.

As a cognate of con-

tract, one of the most important notions in the common law,
contractor carries a myriad of implications in CONTEXT 1 . Yet
even if this is known to the ADDRESSEE and he therefore reads
independent contractor to mean "a contractor who is independent" or "one who contracts independently," he has improperly
DECODED the MESSAGE.

Like servant, independent contractor

denotes a sense which is set out elsewhere in the Restatement.

Further, part of its meaning may be derived from the

law of contracts.

But since servants--as well as independent

contractors--may contract,

the distinguishing semantic in-

tent ( . . • whether one . . . is [x] or [y] . . . ) is lost upon
a reader who recognizes only that contractor is different in
CONTEXT

if he does not recognize that independent contractor
1
means something quite different from the legal meaning of
contractor combined with either the general meaning of independent or a specialized meaning for it in CONTEXT 1 •

More

specifically, when not used to modify contractor, independent
carries

no

specialized

sense

in CONTEXT .
1

But when

the
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phrase occurs, the two words combine to constitute a unique
CONTEXT 1 , 46 and only then.
Servant and independent contractor are syntactically
juxtaposed

in a

relationship of

tithesis) in Section 220.

contradistinction

(or

an-

The unique characteristics of ser-

vant provide a clue to the ADDRESSEE that independent contractor must be treated as a phrasal unit and that it, like
servant, will be likely to carry a specialized sense.

In

short, the binary relationship that is clearly established by
syntactical form offers a key to CONTEXT.
A similar syntactical clue draws the ADDRESSEE'S attention to matters of fact.
posit ion

(i.e. ,

the

The cataphoric indicator of ap-

following)

which precedes

carries no specialized meaning in CONTEXT 1 .
ever,

this phrase

It does, how-

indicate that matters of fact denotes the categoriza-

tion that will embrace all ten of the appositive clauses.
Such categorization, especially when implemented to compare
and define, is nearly bound to have specialized implications
in CONTEXT .
1
The object of the preposition in this phrase, fact,
has far-reaching implications, as well as narrowly specialized meanings,
tinctions

are

in CONTEXT .
1
explicit

here,

While no juxtaposed contradiswhenever an ADDRESSEE who is

46 "An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not
controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to
control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking.
He may or may not be an agent."
Restatement, sec. 2(3).
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familiar with CONTEXT 1 confronts the phrase, matters (or issues or questions} of fact, he knows that at least one dialectic is implied:

matters of fact as opposed to matters (or

issues or questions)

of law,

or as opposed to matters of

opinion, or to both.
As with servant, precedential authority compels the
In its broadest sense
in any CONTEXT 1 .
there, fact is "either a state of things, that is, an exist-

meaning of

fact

ence, or a motion, that is, an event." 47

In terms of pro-

cedure, "questions of fact are for the jury; questions of law
for the court . . . , u 48 and
[a] "fact", as distinguished from the "law," may be
taken as that out of which the point of law arises, that
which is asserted to be or not to be, and is to be presumed or proved to be or not to be for the purpose of
applying or refusing to apply a rule of law.
49
In relation to opinion,
[t]he word "facts," as used in the proposition that
representation must consist of "matters of fact" distinguishes "fact" from mere matters of opinion.
50
Since the Restatement section deals not with facts, but with
criteria for their selection, matters of fact must be treated
as phrasal to retain the above distinctions:

to enable the

47 John Stuart Mill, ed.,

[Jeremy] Bentham on Rationale of Judicial Evidence (London: Hunt and Clarke, 1837},
p. 48.
N.E.

92

48 Hinckley v. Town of Barnstable, 311 Mass. 600, 42
2nd 581.
49 b'd
.!.___!__ • ' p • 584 •

s.w.

50 Brown v. South Joplin Lead & Zinc Mining Company,
699, 194 Mo. 681.
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ADDRESSEE to DECODE the ten appositive clauses as:

(1) con-

siderations which must be based upon actual "existences" or
"events" rather than upon opinions, and

(2)

considerations

which must rest with juries rather than with judges.

This

second consideration gains obvious importance by virtue of
the seventh amendment prohibition against reexamination of
facts that are once determined by a jury. 51
Coincidentally,

this

phrase

remains

idiomatically

current in CONTEXTg in such constructions as:

"As a matter

of fact, I've been waiting for hours.," and "He maintains a
matter-of-fact attitude."
ever,

The evolution of this phrase, how-

seems to have occur red in a fashion opposite to the

parallel evolution of servant;
CONTEXTg for matter of fact. 52

that is, CONTEXT 1 predates
In any event, the two CON-

TEXTS have become quite dissimilar (yet still retain a kernel
of shared sense).
Because they are intended to transmit MESSAGES that
are matters of fact--as opposed to matters of law--the ten
appositive clauses are composed almost exclusively of words
whose CONTEXT 1 is identical to CONTEXT g" 53 Yet even here,
similar hazards for the reader exist.
Any word drawn from

51 u.s. Constitution amendment VII.
52 oxford English Dictionary, see the examples under
definitions A.a. and A.b.
53 The exceptions are master, servant, and principal,
all of which are introduced, at least by implication, in the
initial construction. See notes 39 and 40 above.
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CONTEXTg may take on a specialized CONTEXT 1 simply by virtue
of its being focused upon in litigation.
If, for example,
digging ditches by hand is held not to be a distinct occupation or business while doing so with a tractor is held to
the contrary, that phrase would take on a discriminating CONTEXT 1 only accessible through painstaking research.
Having examined some of the intricacies of CONTEXT
that are involved in DECODING legal MESSAGES, we may move on
to the dynamics of the ADDRESSER-ADDRESSEE relationship that
are peculiar to legal language.

Since it is obvious that

when both parties to a verbal event share a CODE and a sense
of CONTEXT (as when the communication is between lawyer and
lawyer or lawyer and judge) few problems will intrude, I am
here concerned with the event where those features are not
shared.

Such events transpire frequently in law office con-

ferences with clients, and in the courtroom where neither
litigant nor juror is intimate with the language of the law.
If the lawyer or judge speaks of a matter with legal significance, and he maintains the specificity and precision of
legal language, the transmission may be schematized as follows:54
CONTEXT 1
MESSAGE
ADDRESSER1 ----------------------------------------ADDRESSEEg
CODE
1
CONTACT 1
54 Here, I begin using "1" and "g" as subscripts with
ADDRESSER, ADDRESSEE, CODE, and CONTACT.
(See note 33
above.)
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But since the ADDRESSEEg is unfamiliar with CONTEXT 1 (and, to
a lesser extent, with CODE 1 ) this event is almost bound to
prove unsuccessful.

It would approximate--but not be iden-

tical to--a situation where a speaker of English is addressing a speaker of Spanish.

And, as every practicing lawyer

and sitting judge knows, at least a modicum of translation is
as

necessary between lawyers and laymen as

speakers of foreign tongues.

it is between

Since the lawyer or judge will

be the single party who is familiar with both CONTEXTS (and
both CODES--to whatever degree that these have separate existences), he will be the one compelled to fulfill the role
of translator.
If, for example, the lawyer is asked by a client to
predict the outcome of a particular suit, he will first listen carefully to
events.

the

client's narrative of

the pertinent

Then, through research and further investigation he

will align those events with the pertinent rules of law; this
will involve renaming (or RECODING 55 ) certain existences and
events.

In effect, he will have translated the factual sit-

uation into the CODE and CONTEXT shared by the legal profession.

Finally, he will respond to the client's inquiry by

re-translating the result of his research into language that
is accessible to the client.

This entire process may be

schematized in four steps.

55 see Miller, 2£· cit., p. 95.

37

1.

Client narrates events to lawyer:
CONTEXTg
MESSAGE#i

ADDRESSER --------------------------------ADDRESSEE 1
(client) g
CODEg
(lawyer)
CONTACT
2.

g

Lawyer predicts legal consequences (to himself):
CONTEXTg ----:>~ CONTEXT 1

MESSAGE#i------------------------------~MESSAGE#ii

CODEg----------:>~ CODE 1
3.

Lawyer translates probable legal consequences (for
client) :

CONTEXT 1---------/)>~cONTEXTg

MESSAGE~trll
.. --------------------------"~MESSAGE~ ...
~
trlll

CODE 1------------/)>~cODEg

4.

Lawyer relates probable legal consequences to client:
CONTEXTg
MESSAGE-IL ...

trlll

ADDRESSER 1-------------------------------ADDRESSEEg
(lawyer)
CODE g
(client)
CONTACT
In

this

process,

the

second

verbal events 1

but by virtue of

involved 1

resemble

they

g

and

third

steps

are

not

the ENCODING and RECODING

verbal events. 56

The

resemblance

56 The refining and reorganization of information
that is involved in these steps is similar to that kind of
recoding that we perform when we translate our experiences
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has

this

important

characteristic:

whether

the

lawyer's

role in a verbal event is that of ADDRESSER or ADDRESSEE,
where the other party to the event is a layman, the lawyer
must

assume

listen

(or

a

dual

speak)

in

linguistic

responsibility:

two languages at once.

he

must

He must be

an ADDRESSEE 1 +g to the precise extent that the language
of the law differs from the language of general parlance.
The translations involved may be per formed so rapidly that
the lawyer himself may not even be aware of the function
he is performing, as with an uncomplicated case in step three
above.

Or those translations may be quite complex and time-

consuming, as in step two where a great deal of research and
analysis is required (e.g., in a case that will turn upon the
CONTEXT 1 of equal protection of the laws) •

To the lawyer who

will take affront at such a substantial part of his profession being characterized as mere translation, I ask that he
consider the case of the Christian missionary who attempts to
teach the Word of Scripture to a primitive society where no
translation of the Book exists.

I mean to set up no ethical

or metaphysical analogy, but simply one that speaks of the
task's complexity.
This paradigmatic representation is meant to demonstrate the unique and important roles that the lawyer serves

into words, but since it is a mental receding of an already
verbally coded message, it is once removed from the experiential level.
If "[t] he kind of linguistic receding that
people do seems . . • to be the very lifeblood of the thought
processes," (ibid.) the sort of receding that I have represented in steps two and three above is close to heart of what
is known as "thinking like a lawyer."
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as ADDRESSER and ADDRESSEE.

By virtue of his peculiar ca-

pacity to ENCODE statements of fact into predictions of legal
consequences

(step 2)

and to RECODE those predictions into

advice as to rights and duties (step 3), he is able to offer
access to the edifice of the law.
One of
court.

the manifestations of

that

edifice

is the

By the time that two parties to a dispute come to

court for its resolution, the four steps, enumerated above,
will have been performed by both.

The attorneys for each

will have predicted the legal consequences from the facts,
and those

(frequently tentative)

predictions will run con-

trary to each other.
As advocates and adversaries, the two attorneys will
argue why their respective processes of translation--correlations of fact and law--are correct.

The form of these ar-

guments will be highly constrained by the rules of procedure,
and what may and may not be presented will be determined by
the law of evidence.

Where the CONTACT, that "physical chan-

nel and psychological connect ion between the addresser and
addressee," 57 occurs in court--whether it be oral or written-the informational content of the MESSAGE must conform to the
artificial, but necessary constraints of procedure and evidence.
Further, the processes of translation of MESSAGES in
and out of CONTEXTl must be continuously performed by the at-

57 see note 12 above.

40

torneys in order to maintain effective communication between
the clients and the court.

(In a broader sense, these trans-

lations ensure communication between the parties to litigation and the law.)
When a jury is impaneled, the mix of verbal events
becomes even more complex. Through a careful blend of CONTEXT1 and CONTEXTg, 58 the attorneys and the judge must bear
the

responsibility
jurors. 59

for

accommodating

that

audience

of

The necessity for constant translation by lawyers and
judges where audiences include laymen points to an important
feature of that subset of speech events in the language of
the law.

That subset may be characterized through the single

constituent element of Jakobsen's paradigm that remains un-

58 "When we are seeking to clarify some of the important terms in a discussion, we can quote definitions from a
dictionary.
But the dictionary definitions will suit our
purposes only when these accepted definitions agree with our
notions. Sometimes, however, we have to devise our own definitions, either because the accepted definitions are too
vague or because we believe them to be erroneous or inadequate.
In such cases, we stipulate the meaning we will attach to certain terms in our discussion." Corbett,~· cit.,
p. 112. When terms of law are at issue, stipulative definition becomes imperative to bridge the gap between CONTEXT
and CONTEXT .
g
1
59 But in light of the dynamics of the ADDRESSER-ADDRESSEE relationship, audience accommodation extends well
beyond processes of translation.
Especially in an advocacy
situation, "[a]ccommodation involves the method and manner of
developing the entire argument--what evidence you use and how
you use it, what appeals you make and how you make them. Accommodation affects the order in which you set forth the separate arguments and the weight and emphasis you give to each
of them. It determines many features of style." Ebbitt and
Ebbitt, 2£· cit., p. 169.
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11
il

considered in this discussion--CONTACT.
element by asking the question:

Let us approach this

does Section 220 fulfill the

requirements of a CONTACT for the non-lawyer?

Put another

way, does Section 220 provide "a physical channel and psychological connection" sufficient for the non-lawyer to seize
its MESSAGE?
The physical channel is certainly there, but the psycholog ical connect ion,

in order to be successful, must be

predicated upon a shared CODE and a common sense of CONTEXT.
I think, given our previous discussions of CODE and CONTEXT,
these must be considered deficient and, hence, inadequate for
successful MESSAGE transmission.

This inadequacy may finally

be seen as a function of CONTACT, the document itself.

The

net effect of the inaccessibility of such legal documents as
Section 220 is that the layman will need a lawyer to construe
its meaning for him.
Whether this is necessary or unnecessary, just or unjust, avoidable or unavoidable is beyond the scope of this
discussion.

I ask the reader to draw his own conclusions on

those matters.

My project here extends only to the presenta-

tion of a model for analyzing samples of legal language, and
depends for its validity upon its capacity to reach all of
the crucial variables that are found in lawyers' language. 60

60 The importance of the choice of a sample for analysis should also be noted in this context.
If (a) the presuppositions that led to the choice of Section 220(2) were
well-founded (see notes 2 and 4 above), and (b) that sample
is, in fact, representative, the analytical scheme should, if
properly applied and extended by extrapolation, have utility.

42

My contention is that the Jakobsen scheme, by virtue of its
concern with the whole event--unlike diction,

grammar, or

even rhetoric alone--does so.
In closing, allow me to generalize upon the critical
postures that I have brought to bear upon Section 220.

Be-

ginning with the non-lexical elements of CODE, I scanned the
speech event for features that might be considered to evidence departures from standard usage for, as Professor Dickerson suggests,

"general adherence to the existing conventions of language" 61 should always provide the foundation

upon which good writing is built.

Where such departures were

found, as with the great syntactical length of Section 220, I
then sought justification for those departures that may counterbalance the difficulty that they cause the reader.

But it

should be noted that this search for justification may be inappropriate where

the presumption of careful drafting and

editing is not warranted.

In any event, though, the disad-

vantage of a departure from common convention must be balanced with a correlative advantage gained by it.

In my anal-

ysis of nonlexical elements, I found the sentence length, the
inclusion of the int-errupting phrase, and the structure of
the appositive phrases and clauses to be justified by other
concerns.

Further, I found the difficulty that these de-

partures cause the reader to be minimized by other devices:
maximum ellipsis, close punctuation, symmetry through paral-

61 see pp. 7-8 above.
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lelism, and enumerated tabulation.
Next, I scanned the Section for lexical elements of
CODE to discover the difficulty of the diction.

By analyzing

these in terms of their CONTEXT, I was able to establish some
categories for the diction of the law. 62 In this part of my
analysis, I was also able to estimate the accessibility of
the passage to legal and non-legal ADDRESSEES, taking into
account syntactical and other clues to the specialized dietion of the law.
Since the problem of CONTEXT is intimately related to
ADDRESSER-ADDRESSEE relationships,

and since the variables

there are few, I next surveyed the permutations of those relationships.

The anticipated ADDRESSER-ADDRESSEE relation-

ship of a legal document should never be ignored, especially
where the lawyer will be compelled to fulfill the role of
translator.
Finally, I looked at the character of the CONTACT itself, emphasizing the fact that it must facilitate an adequate "psychological connection" to make MESSAGE transmission successful.

Here, once again, the importance of proper

identification of the other elements of Jakobsen's paradigm-to wit, ADDRESSER, ADDRESSEE, CODE and CONTEXT--was stressed.
It must finally

be borne in mind that the Jakobsen

paradigm is not a critical device to supplant all others;
rather, its utility is completely dependent upon the critic's

62 For another categorization of the diction of the
law,~ Mellinkoff, £2· cit., pp. 11-20.
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facility with such primary critical skills as versatility
with

grammar,

syntax,

usage,

style

and

rhetoric.

These

critical disciplines categorize and articulate what Dickerson refers to as the "principles of communication [that] are
not a matter of legal fiat." 63 They are therefore essential
to any characterization of CONTEXT or CODE.
placeable.

They are irre-

As a secondary critical device,

the Jakobsen

paradigm integrates and supplements them to fashion a kind of
holistic, as opposed to atomistic, view of the speech event.
It is my position that the integrity and defensibility of the language of lawyers depends upon an ordering
and focusing of critical skills.
foregoing

discussion

might

focus.

63 see p. 7 above.

It is my hope that the

contribute

to

that

order

and
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